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INTRODUCTION
For state-regulated investor-owned utilities, integrated
resource planning is not easily divorced from the issue of
incen tive regulation (Beecher, et al., 1991 and 1994).
Least-cost planning can and has been implemented under
traditional rate base/rate-of-return regulation.  Experience
in this area is far more extensive for elect ric than  for
water utilities.  However, a growing literature emphasizes
the inherent limitat ions of traditional economic
regulation, particularly in terms of providing performance
and planning incentives.  A frequently held view is that
traditional ratemaking presents barr iers both to cost
efficiency and technological innovation (Bonbright, et al.,
1988).
THE NEED FOR INCENTIVES
With respect to electric utilities, David Moskovitz points
out that:  (1) each kilowatthour a  utility sells,  no matter
how much it costs to produce or how little it sells for, adds
to revenues; (2)  each kilowatthour saved or replaced with
an energy efficiency measure, no matter how little it costs,
reduces utility revenues; (3) the only direct financial
aspect of regulation that encourages utilities to pursue
cost-effect ive conservation is the risk that dissatisfied
regulators may disallow costs; and (4) purchases of power
from cogeneration, renewable resources,  or other
nonutility sources add little to utility profits,  no matter
how cost-effective they are.  For their part, utility
managers are motivated to pursue str ategies that increase
revenues, keep expenses down, and increase capital
investments on which a return can be earned. 
Thus, traditional regulation  may incorporate substantial
disincentives for some important aspects of integra ted
resource planning.  For example, least-cost planning
emphasizes providing utili ty services with the least-cost
mix of supplies and efficiency improvements.  However,
even if cost-effective, conservation and demand
management may add little to utility earnings and thus
discourage utility managers from including these options
in long-term plans.  Incentive regulation can be used to
help overcome this problem. 
Incen tive regulation  in general consists of innovative
regulatory approaches designed to provide utilities with
incentives to achieve specified per formance goals or
standards.  Most incentive regulation programs that have
been initiated or proposed have occurred in either the
energy or telecommunications sectors.  In many cases,
incentives have been provided in  a partially deregula ted
environment.
Each form of incentive regulation generally involves a
mechanism by which utilit ies are induced to increase
efficiency through a system of rewards and penalties.  One
form incorporates rates of return tied to cost performance
while another form involves cost-of-service indexing.
Another  form incorporates price regulation, with the
purpose of providing the utility with enhanced pricing
flexibility.  Yet another form consists of incentives for
capital investment in demand management.  Most forms,
whether involving per formance assessment or price caps
replacing rate of return restraints, have the intent of
promoting cost efficiency.  Incentive regulation addresses
the problem of cost control under traditional regulation.
Incen tive regulation can  incorporate the yardstick or
benchmark approach in which the performance of the
target utility is evaluated on the basis of the performance
of the same utility over time or through the use of an
index or a control group of comparable uti lities.  These
forms of regulatory innovation obviously can affect utility
costs, rates, and qual ity of service.  Some forms of
incentive regulation can reduce regulatory costs, but this
is not typically the case with demand management and
conservation incentives. 
DEMAND-MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES
Traditional regulation provides strong incentives for the
utility to avoid conservation or demand-management
investments.  For example, investment in supply-side
facilities generally is easier to recover than investment in
conservation.  Even when the conservation investment is
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more efficient than either producing or purchasing the
incremental supplies, cost recovery is easier for the
supply-side investment.  The bias against demand-side
investment in traditional ratemaking is simple.  With
traditional regulation, short-term profit considerations
motivate utility managers to increase utility sales;
conservation  poses the threat of revenue erosion , which in
turn threatens earnings.  If the utility installs conservation
equipment on the premises of the ratepayer , it may be
allowed to recover its capital investment (with a lesser
possibility of a return on that investment) from ra tepayers.
However, the real savings from the conservation
investment accrues to the ratepayer.  Thus, there persists
an incentive-driven bias toward meeting incremental
demand by increasing supplies.
Because traditional regulation does not necessarily
provide utilities with  incen tives to implement
conservation and load management, a number of
alternative ratemaking approaches have been proposed.
The goal is to make cost-effective conservation and
demand management at least  as attractive an investment
as supply alternatives.  Some of the incentive mechanisms
that have been proposed for use in promoting
demand-side management by electric ut ilities in clude:
shared savings, bonuses based on units saved, adjustments
to overall rates of return and return on equity, mark-up on
expenditures, ratebasing of demand management
investments, an employee bonus pool, and various other
cost recovery and revenue recovery mechanisms.  Thus
far, the application  of these methods in the water sector is
almost nonexistent.  Their use, of course, would require
commission approval.  
 
State regulators have recognized the argument for
providing utility incentives for conservation programs and
other means of implementin g integrated resource
planning.   According to Oregon Commissioner Myron
Katz, treating conservation as a  resource is an  approach
that provides utilities with  incen tives to invest in cost-
effective conservation, achieves least-cost system
objectives, is theoretically sound, and is fair to all
ratepayers.  In this view, allowing utilities to charge
consumers for conservation  services serves equity and
efficiency policy goals.
Nevada Commissioner Stephen  Weil has advocated
several regulatory incentives for the utility to make
conservation  investment.  One is to establish a revenue
adjustment mechanism tha t insures that unexpected
changes in sales volume do not affect earnings; this
revenue adjustment mechanism would eliminate the
short-term disincentive of potential revenue erosion with
demand-side programs.  Another regulatory incentive is
commission allowance of both capital recovery and return
on demand-side investment.  Most state commissions
permit both recovery and a rate of return on supply-side
investment but permit only the recovery of demand-side
investment as an operating expense.  Allowing a  rate of
return on demand-side investment would provide equal
treatment for demand-side and supply-side programs.  
The incentives for demand management can serve either
as an alternative to the construction  or leasing of new
capacity.  Similar incentives could be designed to induce
water utilities to develop automatic meter reading
capability that could be marketed to other ut ilities.
Incen tives could be employed to induce water  utilities to
develop new services including maintenance services for
water consuming equipment  (for example,  fire pr otection
systems) and the marketing of both water-using and
water-conserving equipment.
Most incentives are directed toward utility investors; that
is, they provide ways for investors to earn a higher return
on their investment.  The logic behind investor incentives
is that higher earnings are linked, in part, to demand
growth.  There is some limited evidence to suggest,
however, that growth  is not a necessary condition of
profitability.  According to one study, changing the
corporate culture of public utilities may prove more
essential to the adoption of demand-side management
programs:
There is a widespread misconception that limiting utility
sales growth is bad for [electricity] utility investors.  The
evidence overwhelmingly contradicts this view.  Limiting
sales growth via [demand-side management] programs
should not, therefore, be assumed to be financially
unattractive to utility investors.  Growth-limiting
[demand-side management] programs may be unattractive
to utility managers, however, because less growth could
mean lower salar ies and less power and prestige.  The
analysis suggests that the focus of [demand-side
management] incentive programs should be on utility
employees, not on the stockholders.  The ultimate
challenge for utilities and commissions is to find ways to
change utility corporate cultures to be more suppor tive of
[demand-side management].     
Managers in the water util ity industry have been as supply
oriented as managers in electricity, and understandably so
given the past abundance of water resources and the
incentives provided under traditional regulation.  In the
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design of incentive regulation programs, therefore, it
might be worthwhile to consider managerial incentives for
adopting conservation and demand management along
with incentives directed toward utility investors.  It is
particularly important that managers do not perceive the
regulatory interest in integrated water resource planning
as punit ive in nature.
A number of incentives have been specifically designed to
encourage demand-management by energy, and now
water, utilit ies.  These can be categorized as follows
(Beecher, et al., 1994): 
C Cost-recovery mechanisms to improve revenue
stability, reduce regulatory lag, and ensure that the
util ity would be able to promptly recover in rates all
prudently incurred costs of demand-side programs.
C Lost-revenue mechanisms that would adjust rates to
compensate for the short-term loss in base sales,
revenues, and profits that result from successful
demand-side programs.
C Performance-motivation mechanisms that provide
bonuses (or penal ties) for meeting (or not meeting)
program goals to help offset the risks perceived by
utility managers, and motivate utility shareholders to
expand cost-effective demand-side programs.
The key variations of these incentives are provided in
Table 1.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Demand management raises several  implementation
issues.  Obviously, the selection of the reward mechanism
(for example, rate of return versus management bonuses),
the specification of how savings from demand-side
programs are to be shared between the utility and its
ratepayers, and regulatory treatment of demand-side
investments relative to supply-side investments are the
key regulatory issues.  Other  implementation issues are of
a more technical nature, such as those relating to
measuring the effectiveness of demand-management
incentives.  
Incentive regulation aimed at demand management
provides the potential for  cost efficiency but does not
reduce regulatory costs as would incentive regulation
aimed at pricing.  The demand management incentive
approach  suffers an acceptability problem in the context
of regulators being reluctant to provide parallel treatment
for demand-side and supply-side investment.  By contrast,
there ar e no specific characteristics of water utilities that
would hinder the application of demand management
incentives to water utility regulation.  Indeed, some
demand management incentives may have more potential
benefits in water than  in other uti lity sectors.
The various incentive approaches need to be examined in
the context of standard regulatory practice and operating
procedures.  The key issue is whether  incen tive regulation
can improve the performance of water uti lities under
commission jurisdiction.  As Dennis Goins indicates, the
answer to this question is a function of answers to a set  of
other questions including:
C Which aspect of water utility operations should the
incentive approach be directed at improving? h o u l d
performance of this  operation component be
measured?
C Should performance be evaluated against an  index
group of similar util ities?
C How should the util ity receive the rewards and
penalties associated with  its performance?
C What level of rewards and penalties is required to
induce performance improvements?
Conceptual ly, incentive regulation approaches should be
based on comprehensive performance measures to avoid
the deliber ate sacrifice of one per formance dimension for
another.  The incentive approach should be easy to
understand and reliable in achieving cost  efficiency.  The
incen tive approach should address only the aspects of
utility performance under management control; it should
avoid penalizing or  rewarding for performance results
beyond management control.  An effective approach
should provide a framework to promote efficiency through
management decision making;  that is, management must
have appropriate and fair incentives to improve
performance.  The approach should provide signals to
management to be efficient in both the short-term and the
long-term, and not sacrifice long-term for short-term
performance.  
In brief, the incentive regulation plan must achieve a
balance between predictability (to motivate per formance)
and flexibility (to accommodate changes in the
environment).  An effective incentive system must be
redesigned and reevaluated constantly to allow for
changing economic conditions, regulatory conditions, and
risks.  And if an appropriate level of regulatory oversight
is to be mainta ined, in centive plans must avoid "giving
away the store," even in the context of promoting
integrated resource planning goals.
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TABLE 1
REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR DEMAND MANAGEMENT BY
INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES
General type
of incen tive
Specific type
of incen tive Explanation
Cost-recovery
mechanisms
Deferral to rate
case
Deferral of accounting for varia tions in expenses until a subsequent rate case
Flow through
costs to rates 
Accounting for variat ions in expenses through the use of an adjustmen t clause,
surcharge,  rider, or other ratemaking mechanism
Modified cost
accounting
Recovery streams other than immediate, straight-line amortization used to mitigate
the short-term effects of costs on rates and improve revenue stability
Ratebase
recovery
The inclusion of demand-side expenditures, including general  and administ rative
costs associated with planning and management,  in the util ity's ratebase
Special-purpose
rates
Rate-design alternatives that enhance the utility's ability to invest in demand-side
resources and recover associated costs 
Lost-revenue
mechanisms
Cost-based
pricing
Pricing schemes, such as incremental-cost pricing, that account for short-run and
long-run costs so that lost revenues are matched by reduced costs
Revenue
adjustments
Demand-side specific revenue requirement adjustments to compensate for lost sales
and revenues
Decoupling sa les Methods that separate unit sales from revenues, and profits in the regulatory
determinat ion of revenue requirements so that reductions in  sales do not cause
reductions in earnings
Selling services A decoupling strategy emphasizing sales of uti lity services, as compared to sales of
conventional utility outputs
Alternative
regulation
Alternatives to traditional ratebase/rate-of-return regulation used to eliminate
incentives that  favor supply-side over demand-side activities 
Performance-
motiva tion
mechanisms
Expense or
ratebase markup
A percentage markup in the value of certain demand-side expenses or r atebased
demand-side investments
Rate-of-return
adjustments
Adjustments to return on equity (or overall rate of return) used to reward or penalize
utilities for progress in demand-side programs
Shared savings A sharing formula to compensate a utility for some or all of the costs, both  direct
and indirect, that result from a demand-side program
Bounty or unit
bonuses
A predetermined payment provided to utility shareholders for participating in
demand-side programs or exceeding unit conservation goals
Management
rewards
A predetermined payment provided to utility managers for building successful
demand-side programs or exceeding unit conservation goals
Source:  Beecher, et al., 1994.
